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STOP AND FRISK AND SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW PANEL: INTRODUCTION
MARY I. COOMBS*

Welcome back to the final panel of the conference, on
the relation of stop and frisk doctrine to substantive criminal law.
Since I am a visiting professor at St. John's, I can take
two positions. First, as a quasi-outsider, I want to thank
John Barrett and Charles Bobis and the rest of the people
from St. John's who organized the conference. Second, as a
quasi-insider, I want to express my thanks and admiration
to all the panelists for their contributions to an absolutely
spectacular conference. Thank you all.
This is a roundtable, not a panel, on the relationship of
stop and frisk to substantive criminal law, a topic which
has floated through the conference in a number of places,
most clearly in the comments earlier today of Professor
Tracey Meares.! The four of us on the dais will each speak
very briefly, and then we're going to open it up, I hope, to a
lot of questions.
I remember that when I first taught Terry,2 it occurred
to me that Officer McFadden could probably have arrested
Terry for loitering and avoided the whole stop and frisk issue. I recently had one of our trusty law librarians obtain
for me the relevant Cleveland ordinance that was apparently in effect at the time of Terry.' Let me read to you the
section that seems applicable:
Whoever is found loitering about any barroom, gambling device,
or about pools on baseball, prizefights, or horse racing; or is
* Visiting Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law, Spring 1998;
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
' See Tracey L. Meares, Terry and the Relevance of Politics, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.

REV. 1343 (1998).
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968).
3 This "suspicious persons" ordinance was later declared unconstitutional. See
City of Cleveland v. Forrest, 223 N.E.2d 661 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1967).
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found wandering about the streets, either by day or by night,
without being able to give a reasonable and satisfactory account
of themselves ...[or who] obtains his living by criminal means
and practices... [or] is the companion and associate of criminals or other dissolute persons shall be guilty of a misde4
meanor....

(I can't resist, amongst an audience of lawyers, adding
one of the other forbidden activities: "loiter[ing] around
Courts of Justice, or other public places, for the purpose of
soliciting the employment of professional services ....)'
The participants in this roundtable discuss how and
why Officer McFadden, or contemporary police departments, might operate under stop and frisk and/or under
substantive criminal laws, such as this or more modern
variations. Our first speaker is Debra Livingston of Columbia Law School. Our second speaker is William Stuntz
of the University of Virginia Law School. I will then speak
briefly and our final speaker will be the Honorable Judge
John Keenan of the Southern District of New York.

CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE §13.0935 (Supp. 1951).
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